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The Darfur Operation is much disputed, often times it is called unsuccessful. The operation started ten years 
ago, and in addition to other donors, the EU took an important role in the advocacy, not to mention the fact 
that it launched its own support operation. This was the second operation of the EU in Africa. It worked with 
less people than the Artemis Operation did, but it lasted for nearly three years. Although the operation had to face 
several challenges, it can be called effective from the perspective of the European Union and its member 
states. They could utilize the lessons learned from the mission related to further operations. However, several 
pieces of research have been made on the European Union’s activity in Darfur, but the participants of the 
mission did not share their experiences except for one or two conferences and articles. I (the author) served 
for six months in the operation in 2005. After coming home, I followed the events in the area. This research is 
based on my subjective experiences, other peacekeeper’s knowledge, archived and open sources. 
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On February, 2003, a revolution broke out in the western part of Sudan, Darfur. The insurgen- cy was led by the Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). The SLM/A regarded itself as the representative of the majority population in 
Darfur. The rebellious organisation, and its ally, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), took up arms against the 
policies of the central government. Their major problem was that the black African farmers did not receive 
governmental protection against the attacks of the Arabian nomadic group, the Janjaweed. The government responded 
with military strikes. As part of the actions against the rebellions, the government forces committed ethnic cleansing 
among the innocent civilian population too. The Sudanese government forces and the Janjaweed units burnt down and 
destroyed hundreds of villages, causing the death of thousands, banishing millions of citizens, attacking and raping 
thousands of women. [1] The president of Chad, whose country was affected by the conflict too, summoned the 
opposing parties to the negotiating table in the summer of 
2003. They set a cease-fire accord, however, it only lasted till 5th  December – when the hos- tilities recrudesced. [2] Up 
to 30th  September, 2004, thirty-thousand people became victims of the battles, and nearly one million people lost their 
homes. 2000 out of the one million dis- placed people fled to the neighbouring Chad. The African Union (AU) had to 
face the threat that the conflict was spreading to the neighbouring countries. Therefore, they put forward the launch of a 
peace operation. As a result of the international pressure the government and the 
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insurgent forces on 8th April, 2004, set up a cease-fire agreement in N’djamena. The supervi- sor of the agreement was 
the African Union – supported by the USA, and the EU. The Afri- can Union took the role of the mediator during the 
peace talks.2  However, due to the USA’s pressure (whose government, according to the Swedish government, labelled 
the events in Darfur a genocide) the United Nations requested in a resolution the African Union to advance a 
peacekeeping mission. As a consequence of the pressure of the international community, the Sudanese government and 
the political opponents accepted establishing the mission. The AU sent a unit to Darfur between 7th  and 20th  May, 2005 
to estimate the possibilities of set- ting up an observation mission. [3] After getting the report from the group, the AU 
Security Council made a resolution on 25th  May 2005. In the resolution they put the peacekeeping operation into 
action, however, the Sudanese government, the rebels and the representatives of the AU reached the Addis Ababa 
agreement on 28th  May 2005. It established the Cease- Fire Committee and agreed on sending military observers to 
Darfur. So it started the work of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) whose budget was estimated 26,605,432 USD. [4] 
As this amount of money was not at the AU’s disposal, they immediately addressed a letter to the EU, because the 
European Union was supposed to take a great part of the financing. [5] However, the EU had been supporting the work 
of the AU with a significant amount of mon- ey since the establishment of the African Union on 23th  June, 2005. The 
EU established its own operation to back up the AMIS (also known as the EU civilian-military action to support the 
African Union’s enhanced Mission to Sudan/Darfur), which aims to hold the European support together and to co-
ordinate the work of the observers/advisors sent to Darfur. The operation was financed by the ATHENA mechanism. [6] 
The evaluation of the total upkeep was 2 million Euros.3 
The operation supported the AU’s actions in Sudan with constabulary activities. [7] The operation was initiated at 
the same time when the EU leaders accredited a special repre- sentative (European Special Representative – EUSR), 
Pekka Haavisto4  to Darfur. He was responsible for the cooperative activity of the Union’s political and operational 
actions; moreover, Mr. Haavisto was in charge of the co-ordination too, accordingly he controlled the actions of the 
mission. [8] Furthermore, he was consulting with the AU, the AMIS and the Sudanese government’s leaders. Mr. 
Haavisto participated in the Abuja Peace Confer- ences, where he expressed the interests of the EU. The Addis Co-
ordination Cell helped the 
 
 
2 The AU was unwilling to leave room for other regional organisations to consolidate the situation in Darfur. 
Since the African leaders thought that the problems of the African continent can only be solved by the Africans. The AU recons Darfur its own 
trial-field for their peace-making and sustaining ability, therefore they showed increased sensibility toward all international intervention attempts. 
3 The total is so small because the EU leaders thought that the mission will end by the end of 2005. They expected that after the enlargement 
of the AMIS II, it will be able to operate alone. 
4 Pekka Haavisto was member of the Finnish Parliament (1987–1996), then he was the Environment Minister in the Government of Pavaoo 
Lipponen between 1995–1999. Later on he became a member of the Helsinki Council, a representative of the Greens, and he was a leader of 
several economic organisations as well (for instance World Bank). During programs of the UN, he served in a number of crises areas, for 
example in 
the Balkans (Kosovo), he participated in the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks as a mediator. He is a member of several scientific, economic and 
environmental protectionist organisations. He is a professor of the Finnish University as well as he is a guest tutor in the University of Bristol, 
in the University of Helsinki, and in Oberammergauban as well, at the NATO Academy. He was nominated for the position of the EU’s 
Special Representative in Darfur in 2005, and he held that position until 2007. Between 2007 and 2011 he was commissioned to different 
positions in Helsinki, then in 2012 he was the nominee of the Greens in the presidential elections, where he won second place. 
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work of the police and the political, military work of the special representative regarding the following points: 
•   Daily contact with the EU member states which participate in the mission, as well as keeping in touch with the 
professionals of the Administrative Control and Manage- ment Centre (ACMC) which supervises the Europeans 
supports for the AMIS. 
•   Daily contact with Brussels, supplying information to the leaders of the EU, asking for intervention if necessary 
related to issues out of the competence of the special representative. 
•   Contacting the ambassador in Addis (delegated by European states), other representa- 
tives and the European military/police officers serving in the operation 
•   Collaboration with the supporters of the AMIS (USA, NATO, UN, etc.) to help coordi- 
nate the mission, and to avoid the duplication of certain contributions. 
The EU struggled to uphold their interests not only in the political, but in the military and police areas too, hence 
on 18th  July, 2005, the EU Council in its resolution (2005/557/ CFSP) delegated a leading military advisor (Colonel 
Philippe Mendez, France) and a lead- ing police advisor (Superintendent Douglas Brand, Great Britain) into the 
centre of the AU, Addis Ababa.5  [9] After that the EU’s military and police advisors sent their reports directly to the 
EU headquarters. They could request help from the EU concerning any other issue. [10] 
By September, 2005, the organisation of the EU’s new support operation evolved with a proper reporting system. 
Considering the previous experiences, it took a great part in the assistance and actuation of the AMIS II. 
The new organisational structure of the European operation: [11] 
•   Brussels Coordination Group/EU Military Body – Operational Group of Darfur; 
•   EU Combined Office at the AU’s command; 
•   EU Special Representative and its organisation body (military and police advisors); 
•   European advisors of the Darfur Integrated Task Force, including the groups of the Administrative Control and 
Management Centre/ACMC, as well as the stock of the air-bridge actuation. (Forward Based Movement Cell); 
•   European members of the Cease-Fire Committee; 
•   The European general and police advisors, served in the mission’s command in 
Karthoum; 
•   European general and police advisors served in the mission’s operational command (El 
Fasher) and in the Combined Logistic Operational Centre; 
•   EU military observers in Darfur, and police advisors in external sectors. 
The EU took an active part in the new operation, especially in the training and equipping of the police officers sent to 
the AMIS II. As the African states were not able to send enough well-trained police officers to Darfur, the declared aim 
of the mission, which was to protect refugees, became a risk. Their protection mainly needed police constables, not only 
military personnel. The police had an important role in ensuring the legality, and in building up trust between the 
refugees and the Sudanese police, but the police component was struggling with headcount deficiency. It could 
hardly arrange its own functioning, not to mention the 
 
5 The leading military position was completed by France (Colonel Philippe Mendez), Holland (Colonel Eric Burmeister) and Hungary. The 
Hungarian candidate Colonel Károly Nyitrai lost against the French candidate with a small difference. [9] 
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tasks that were delegated to them. The police component struggled with the following prob- 
lems: [12] 
•   There was no clear idea about the relocation of the policemen, the related plans were incomplete. 
•   The African states were unable to mobilise enough police officers for the mission, so the police forces were not 
able to reach the proper level of their functional ability. 
•   The police officers sent to the mission were lacking the right capabilities. They did not speak English and they 
were poorly trained. These deficits diminished the possible opportunities of the police component. 
•   The Command and Control system of the police forces had problems too. The emula- tion between the soldiers 
and police officers created serious problems too. It lessened not only the effectiveness of the police officers, but 
also the efficiency of the mission. 
•   The logistic system of the AU was not able to ensure the proper provision of equip- ment, lodging, and working 
circumstances for the police officers, who were supposed to ensure 24 hours presence in 40 refugee camps and 25 
important settlements accord- ing to the mission’ objectives. 
These facts were highlighted by a committee in Darfur, in 2005. They made a motion to extend the number of the 
policemen and to improve their training. Henceforth, the EU of- fered a “supporting pocket” on 26th  May, in 2005. In 
this pocket they handled the assistance of the police component accentuated, and they offered help in the following 
areas: 
•   Supporting the command system of the police component: For this the EU offered well qualified, high ranked 
police officers to the AMIS. They functioned as personal advi- sors of the African police leaders. Twenty-four 
police advisors (offered by the EU) got positions at the AMIS, and at the higher commands of the Sudanese 
police agencies (Addis, Khartoum, El-Fasher, and the sector commands). The EU sent the advisors for a six 
month-period of time. By the way, there were some people who extended the serving period more than one time. 
The service superior of the European policemen was the police officer delegated to the Darfur Integrated Task 
Force (DITF) stock. 
•   Participation in the training of the police staff: Generally the training of the staff was made by the EU’s two mobile 
training groups with ten people. Another group (consist- ing of five members) trained those African policemen, who 
became later drill sergeants in the police component. In this way they could improve the effectiveness of the train- 
ing comparatively fast. 
•   Giving assistance and advice how to implement a police operation efficiently. For this purpose the EU sent a high 
ranking police officer to the AU’s command in Addis, who had both political and planning experience. 
According to the previous plans, the EU planned to send 49 police officers and 3 admin- istrators to the operation. 
Although the EU provided all of the necessary equipment for the policemen, they expected lodging, as well as health 
and personal security from the AU.6 [12] In return for an allowance of course. As the mission was not able to ensure the 
proper equip- ment for the advisors, they used the computers and satellite phones financed by the EU. [13] These 
positions were difficult to fill, because the member states were not willing to send 
 
6 But the EU leaders anticipated that the AMIS (which was struggling with a great source deficit) will be not able to assure proper logistic insurance 
to the EU advisors. Therefore they planned a separate budget to assure the needs. This was a right measurement in the light of the further events. 
[12] 
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further advisors. They could fill only 22 positions till August, 2005. Therefore Pedro Serrano, the director of the police 
operations, asked the EU member states to fill the vacant positions with advisors from their own countries. [14] 
In order to achieve the EU’s aim, to send soldiers and police officers to the AMIS II, both the EU and AU leaders had 
to change the rules of the mission’s operation documents, because of the Sudanese government organisation’s demands. 
They just let the European advisors into the country when they were participants of the AMIS, despite the fact that the 
Addis Ababa Agreement (28 May, 2004) enabled the participation of non-African states and organisations too. 
Nevertheless, people sent by the EU constantly faced the fact, that neither the Sudanese people, nor the leaders of the 
mission were happy with their presence. The EU even increased the support for the AMIS, but the situation was getting 
worse. The leaders of the negotiations saw less and less possibilities for a political settlement. The insurgent groups 
divided into smaller bunches, fighting not only agents of the Sudanese Government, but against each oth- er too. The 
Sudanese Government and the Janjaweeds militias burned down more and more settlements, they killed people, they 
committed brutality and they looted. The number of the refugees multiplied. Unequivocally, it was impossible to close 
the conflict with military solutions. But for the measurement of the political solution the success of the AMIS was in- 
dispensable. The peacekeepers were to be able to ballast the region. In order to achieve this, the European Union’s 
Council sent an expert group to survey the real state of the AMIS II between 16th and 22nd September, 2005. They 
analysed the logistic problems, their effects on the function of the mission and they wanted to make moves to the EU 
leaders about the direc- tions of further collaboration. [15] The members of the working groups met with the leaders of 
the AU and the AMIS, as well as the EU advisors and observers in Addis, Khartoum, and El-Fasher. Furthermore, they 
visited several sectors and camps. It can be said that they got a complete picture of the mission’s actions and of the 
current state. Ambassador Kidoulaye and the head of the DITF claimed that because of the AU’s political decision the 
mission could not fail, and they want to continue the support measures and the actuation. According to them, the 
exporting of the African troops cannot be suspended because of the logistical deficiencies. The member states refused 
to send further soldiers and the Aid Organisations demanded more and more military groups from the AMIS so that 
they could maintain their undisturbed humanitarian actions. According to the ambassador, there were not many lo- 
gistical problems, except that there was a lack of air-fuel and the partners (for example the EU) were not able to support 
the mission appropriately in accordance with its needs. Other African leaders did not know that their missions struggled 
with logistic problems. Moreover, they were sure that everything was going well in Darfur. They emphasised the 
necessity of the mission’s expansion too. They thought that with the help of the donors every problem could be solved. 
They were worried more about not getting as much financial support as they had requested. They expressed concerns 
about the transmission of the operation to the UN. Their main goal was to gain absolute control over the subsidies which 
the AU got. They noted that the EU should not set conditions according to this. Unlike them, the military supervisors of 
the mission admitted the problems which were threatening the functioning of the mission. Despite these dangerous 
factors, they talked about the necessity of continuing the operations and managing a new enlargement of the participants. 
In their opinion, putting a robust mil- itary force into action would be the only way to make peace in Darfur. Hence new 
groups, equipment (combat cars, combat helicopters, etc.) and more financial support had to be sent 
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to them. The members of the group saw it unequivocally that the representatives of the AU in Addis were unable to 
control the operations in Darfur and to settle the maintenance of logis- tics. Respectively, the operation command did not 
assure the necessary information. It was obvious that the mission’s command and control system’s work was limited, and 
this was one of the reasons why the mission seemed unsuccessful. The group noted that the leaders of the AMIS did not 
take the advice of the experts who were sent to Darfur in March, 2005.7  [16] They were endeavouring to close the 
mission without a disgraceful failure. At this point an idea came up, that by the middle of 2006 the mission would be 
transferred to the UN. But till that time they asked for further financial help, because at this point the mission was 
struggling with a 40 million Euro deficit, and they expected the acquitting from the donors. According to the Europeans 
who were serving in Darfur, the biggest problems were related to the bad leadership, the lack of collaboration, the bad 
planning, the deficits (air-fuel, food, drinking water, etc.), the lack of competence, and the deterioration of the security 
circumstances. The members of the group reconciled with the leader of the Pacific Architects & Engineers (PAE) (this 
organ arranged the supplement of the mission), who said that the mission had serious logistic problems. For instance the 
AMIS got only 30–51% of the total needs. For example due to the passengers who travelled with the food-delivery 
airplanes the amount of the food diminished and at the end it was never enough. 
Besides the fuel deficit, bad organisation also worsened the provision. The PAE’s leader said that the sector 
commanders often created financial funds, and they bought food from the funds to feed their soldiers. The leader also 
said that he did not see any sense in extending the number of the military groups until the proper circumstances were 
provided. He indicated that they did not know that European police advisors were coming, and it was very difficult to 
give them accommodation. This case showed appropriately the communication problems between the organs of the 
mission. This information was confirmed by the command of the police officers, who were very disappointed because 
of the accommodation they got. How- ever, the group got good news about the mission of the police component, 
nevertheless, of 
1,560 people only 850 arrived.8  [17] Even so the police officers started to move out to the refugee camps and the 
safety rate ameliorated. But the communication and logistic problems further diminished the efficiency of the police 
officers. 
The group indicated in the résumé of the account that the enlargement of the mission tack- led logistic problems, 
particularly the lack of fuel and food. The experts of the Joint Logistic Operation Center (JLOC) ballasted the provision 
system a little,9 [18] but the financial prob- lems, the unserviceable command and control system, the malignancy of the 
parties, the dis- sension of the different elements caused continuous problems. They counselled giving bigger competence 
to the JLOC managing the logistic issues and to establish the Joint Operation 
 
7 Several advisors confirmed that they were very frustrated due to the fact that the AU asked for the EU’s financial-logistic help, but they did not 
care about the opinion of their advisors. Several people were indignant, because the Africans did not respect the Europeans, although the EU was 
the greatest supporter of the AMIS. Several African officers did not know that the EU was giving assistance to them, they thought that the advisors 
are from Canada and America. [16] 
8 The stronger actions of the police officers were the result of the commander-change. The previous police commander was in conflict with the 
military commander of the mission. His follower was the South-African Daniel Moenyana who was much more active than his predecessor. 
9 Sadly the leaders of the mission often ignored the advice of the logistic experts. They just used the ideas of the professionals in case of emergency. 
That is why the leaders of the group noted in the recommendation that the AMIS leaders should use the advice of the experts. [18] 
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Centre (JOC) because if the command was solid, then there would not be any emulation be- tween the components. 
Moreover, they considered the sustainability of the EU’s support very important because it was a core factor for the 
functioning and the cessation of the mission and would be damaging for all participants. Colonel Michael Eger created a 
résumé about the health provision. The medical expert noted that the civilian company (chosen by the AMIS) had 
not assured the services which they offered in the contract. The medical support of the mission was defective. The 
peacekeepers could use the French military force hospitals located in Chad (Abechi and N’djamena), but they were 
1000–2000 km far away. Most of the African troops had no medial crew, the soldiers did not get medical preparation, and 
there were not enough first aid kits. The lieutenant colonel also noted that the European officers serving in Addis and 
Khartoum got normal medical service, but the officers in El-Fasher or in the sectors did not get proper medical support. 
[19] This issue remained a problem till the end of the mission, partly this was one of the reasons why the European states 
did not want to send more advisors and observers to the staff of the AMIS. According to the report of the expert group, 
the EU decided to form their role in the mission in tune with three important aims: [20] 
•   Renewing the political agreements with active participation of the EU; 
•   Helping the AMIS to work more efficiently; 
•   Helping the AU to close the conflict quietly, so after a successful consolidation the 
AMIS could leave Sudan. 
By then the leaders of the EU were expecting (moreover, they offered) the UN to take over the mission, but the AU 
refused this. The EU and other donors decided to continue the assistance for the AMIS’s work despite the chaos. 
According to the plans this help cost 100 million Euros for the European states in 2006. Even so, the EU planned to 
support the medi- um-term transmission of the mission. In November, 2005, the EU Soldier Core made a report analysing 
the situation in Darfur. The utilization of the support and the functioning of the mission were checked. It was noted that 
establishing the DITF was a good idea but creating the correspondence between the operation areas was not successful, 
the policemen and the soldiers took part in the work of the mission in an inadequate way. The DITF leaders often 
contended with the command in Khartoum, and they had no exact information about the events in the area of operation. 
They remarked, according to Khartoum that its role and its tether are often unclear, which leads to conflicts. However, 
the command exercise was to maintain connections with the Sudanese governmental organisations, and to arrange the 
lo- gistic issues of the mission, but in the logistic area it did not engage in major activities. Ac- cording to the command 
in Darfur several negative facts emerged. The AMIS Command did not coordinate the work of the components, there was 
a strong contention between the sectors and other commands, moreover, the peacekeepers were also rivalling. The 
mission split into parts and it did not try to operate uniformly. It worked in accordance with the habit of the current 
commander. Although the JLOC did good work in the logistic area, the Joint Opera- tion Centre existed only in plans so 
the solid control over the mission was not achieved in 
2005. According to the report, the AMIS’s growth was only apparent on paper but actual positive change was not made 
in Darfur. In a way the report condemned the European mem- ber states too because it noted that of the 50 
soldier/policeman positions they only filled 21, from which 16 positions were filled only after February, 2006. Hence the 
EU leadership tried to motivate the member states to take a bigger role in the support. It was asked separately to 
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send a medical officer (because of the deteriorating health circumstances) to the JLOC organ- isation, to facilitate the 
medical support of the European advisors/observers. The countries that sent the advisors/observers saw the problems 
clearly, some of them did not send more advisors to the logistic system of the operation. [21] The EU’s Military Staff 
commander Perruche indicated in his letter to the EU leaders that till the end of 2005 around 100 Europe- an advisors and 
observers served in the AMIS staff. [22] However, to keep up the EU’s role in the mission it was necessary to deploy 
more military and police officers. On 24th  Novem- ber, 2005, the EU Military Staff sent a letter to the member states, in 
which they asked them to testify by 5th December, how they want to support the AMIS further, and they also tried to 
request more observers and advisors to Darfur. But the member states did not hurry with the answer because it seemed 
likely that again they cannot fill 13 positions out of 16 places. Great Britain announced it would diminish the number 
of the advisors. Italy and Spain did not send new ones after the service time of their advisors expired. Hungary claimed 
to leave the mission. Yet, because of the strong commitment of the EU, it was very important to send European advisors 
and to ensure the functional capability of the mission. For this reason, the member states tried everything in order to 
improve the bad work and living conditions of the European advisors. [23] For example they gave them communication 
equipment, they rented houses for the officers serving in El-Fasher so that they could sleep in houses, not in tents. 
They tried to make their living conditions more comfortable in Darfur.10 [24] However, more and more European officers 
complained about the bad living conditions. [25] Moreover, the European military observers did not get their salaries 
from the mission, even though the AU got the money from the donors. The AU was asked a lot of times to pay the 
salaries, but it did not grant that, so the EU paid them from the ATHENEA Mechanism’s budget. [26] It was not easy to 
fill the vacant positions, as the AU demanded more professionals. For example on 29th November, 2005, it requested 
lawyers to Khartoum and El-Fasher in order to arrange the documents of the AMIS II’s operations. [27] In 2006, during 
Colonel Philippe Mendez’s tour of duty, the EU offered only one candidate for the vacancy: Colonel Philippe Beny, who 
be- came the special representative for the next 6 months. [28] This example presents how diffi- cult it was to find other 
European advisors. According to a report, the year 2006 was highly important for the mission, so important to the EU 
that it wanted to extend its role in the mission’s work. A greater involvement did not come into reality, there were 
barely a few European observers in the camps, and the number of the European officers diminished too.11 
In February, 2006, out of 31 positions only 15 were filled. 11 officers wanted to go home before March and there were 
no new officers to replace them. All in all these problems result- ed in the leaving of the EU, for this they created the 
extraction plan. [29] The EU Military Staff’s analyses in 2006, provides information about 2 military observers in 
Chad, while in 
 
10   The EU assumed that they pay for the air travel of the observers between El-Fasher and Khartoum from the budget of the ATHENEA 
Mechanism. They pay their way when they go home too, not just in the case of service. This was necessary because the AMIS launched a regular 
flight between the two cities (with the help of civil enterprises). The flight was not fit for the basic secure requirements. Nevertheless, all of the 
African soldiers and policemen used it. As they often overloaded the airplane, it was a game of hazard to use it. One 
of the airplanes crashed on 24th December, 2005. No one survived the tragedy. Because of this the EU military staff prohibited to use the airplanes 
for the Europeans and gave them tickets for civilian airplanes free of charge. [24] 
11   After the Hungarian secession several countries lowered the number of their personnel in the mission. In the beginning of 2006, this was the 
footing: Cyprus (1 person), France (5 people), Great Britain (2 people), Germany (1 person), Italy (1 person), Austria (1 person), Spain (2 
people), Portugal (1 person). 
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Darfur none. Hence, they drew the attention of member states again to send military and police officers as soon as 
possible. [30] For this only Slovakia applied and sent two observ- ers. [31] In this period the members of the mission 
started to speak officially about the trans- mission of the operations to the world organisation. The EU supported this 
initiative and of- fered further support to execute it as soon as possible. On 30th April, 2006, Brigadier General Francis 
Girand’s duty came to an end as the vice president of the Cease-Fire Committee. The EU appointed Brigadier General 
Oliver Pitty to his position. In the meantime, the Peace Treaty of Darfur was signed, which ensured the EU one new 
position inside of the Cease-Fire Committee. Apart from the job, this officer was responsible for the observers’ and 
advisors’ financial-logistic support, the functioning of the EU ensured communication equipments. This position was 
very useful later, because the people who were serving in the mission often requested and received help from the Main 
Officer. There was a change related to the provi- sion of the officers too, as on 1st  March, 2006, the AU terminated the 
contract with Medical Services Support which provided medical supply to the mission. The Command of the AMIS 
decided that the newly arrived battalion’s medical sections will ensure the primary health care in the mission. The more 
serious surgeries were made exclusively in the state hospital in El-Fasher. [32] However, this concept was not acceptable 
for the EU because of previous experience. The fact that the Nigerian battalions did not bring medical personnel to 
Darfur raised the question: whether the AMIS is able to ensure health care for the European advisors as well or not. [33] 
First, the EU Military Council planned to extract the whole European Staff by 30th  March, 2006. After the agreements 
the EU signed a contract with the US gov- ernment that in exchange for money the PAE takes care of the pressing 
medical service prob- lems for the 30 European officers. [10] In April 2006, the EU Military Council sent a medical group 
of two to Darfur. They proposed various recommendations after the surveys on the field, to improve the health care 
there. [34] For example, till there was no ensured medical service for the European observers, the EU Military Staff 
forbade leaving the camps, so they could not go on patrol. [35] In May, 2006 the EU sent a Swedish medical group to the 
prov- ince who gave advice and organised first aid courses for the African peacekeepers, taught them how to treat at 
least minor injuries. After that the health care problems were solved, the EU introduced new rules to ensure safer 
working conditions for the staff. As a result, the European staff could stay in the mission.12  [36] [47] 
Yet, the attitude of the advisors turned worse, especially in Addis Ababa where the pre- vious collaboration 
disappeared and distrust affected the work quality negatively. [17] Not- withstanding the previous problems, the AU was 
very satisfied with the work of the European advisors and on 18th  May, 2006, they asked the EU to send another six 
advisors. Finally the Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (/FJMHQ) was established in Darfur. Both the police officers 
and civilians played a great role in its work. [37] On 6th June, 2006, the EU eventually offered four staff officers for 
different positions. [38] However, they previously had planned to send home all of the observers. At the end they let 
them stay, moreover they increased their number to 32 people. [14] The member states kept on the constant observer 
circulation 
 
 
12   Soon after this, the DITF asked the Military Staff to ensure the equipment for the AMIS to build two camp hospitals. The EU asked them to 
clarify in their petition what they needed. Their wishes were unduly huge. Moreover they asked for the same medicine for 2.1 million Euros 
from the Swedish too. The EU refused to give the supply because the UN was taking over the mission. They noted, when the AU asked for any 
kind of assistance it had to be constantly re-established and real – for the EU to consider their needs. [36] [47] 
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(generally it worked adequately with few problems) till the cessation of the AMIS. [39] The EU tried to integrate the 
lessons learned by the previous observers and advisors into the train- ing of the new officers. Between 18th  and 20th  June, 
2006, they organised a lessons learned conference in Brussels to which they invited everyone who had served in Darfur 
to date. The ones who could not receive their honours previously had the chance to obtain them during the conference. 
[39] The ex-observers and the advisors made motions in several topics to the EU Military Staff, and they utilized a lot 
from them (ensuring GPS instruments, creating a reference book about the operation, improving the standard of the 
training, etc.). [40] At the same time the EU sent not just soldiers and policemen to the AMIS, but civilian officials too, 
mainly financial, legal and logistic specialists, although they were less visible than the other group members. [41] 
Colonel Francois Amelineau, the military advisor of the EU special representative noted that while the EU still gave 
important support for the AMIS in the beginning of 2007, there were not so many positive results, because the leaders of 
the mission especially the military commander – Mayor General Aprezi – ignored the advice. They demanded the 
financial and logistic support, but they refused the advice related to the utilization of the money because of the 
“African leadership”. Occasionally they tried to play the donors off against each other. From the end of 2006 they gave 
the chance to the UN to participate in the leadership because they were preparing to give the operation to the world 
organisation. In February, 2007, the UN sent 47 military and 30 police advisors to Darfur to coordinate the activities 
related to the problems. Even so the operation struggled with logistic problems. The biggest problem was still the 
supplement of catering, so the AMIS tried to organise 260,000 ready-meal kits, and they expected the financing from 
the donors. France gave them a part of the required mon- ey. [42] The EU remained the major supporter of the mission 
but Brussels planned to pull out the European advisors and observers after the UN’s takeover. This process was 
coordinated by the new special representative Torben Brylle. His predecessor (Pekka Haavisto) got an- other leading 
position at the UN. [43] 
Between 18th  and 20th  June, 2007, the leading officer of the EU’s military staff – Lieu- tenant Colonel Ronald 
Dorenbos – visited the operational area to find out personally what living and working conditions the European 
officers have. Although the lieutenant colonel got reports about the circumstances, he was shocked that the European 
advisors and ob- servers were living in austere conditions. Yet, they were in a good mood and they did their job 
suitably. But the dealing with the European officers astonished him. Albeit they gave a position to every European in 
the mission’s staff, they were not integrated into the AMIS system, and were treated like strangers. For instance, they 
were not allowed to participate in the handover – discussions but they were expected to accomplish every task. [44] There 
were similar cases in El-Fasher, in the organisation of the JLOC. The African commander banished the European and 
Canadian advisors from the discussions, while he was complaining that he did not have enough people to carry out the 
professional duties, not to mention the organi- sation’s tasks related to the handover of the mission. He notified that in 
positions of trust he wanted to see only African officers, and he did not care about the opinions of the “whites”, because 
the mission was under African control. [45] Only those got bigger honour who were in logistic or financial positions, 
those who were indispensable for the mission. Despite all of these difficulties every European soldier tried to work well 
for the AMIS. On the other hand the European police integrated completely into the police component and they became 
indis- 
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pensable for the African police. The health care was better and the health risks lowered. The European observers moved 
out of the rented house because an Egyptian officer who lived in the neighbourhood was killed by unknown people. 
Shortly the Sudanese government organs arrested three people. All of them admitted the commitment of the crime, so 
the Europeans moved back to the house. The lieutenant colonel noted that the three advisors in Khartoum were living in 
civilised living and working conditions. In his report he mentioned that while the EU and the donors were still giving 
important support to the AMIS, it became nearly non-functioning. They were only waiting for the takeover by the UN. 
[46] 
Considering the report, the EU leaders supported the UN’s takeover in every possible way and they continued the 
financial support of the AMIS. The activity of the European military and police officers slowed down, they did not 
undertake new conflicts for the mission. And so they were waiting for the remodelling of the operation, when the 
European contingent was extracted and the EU’s support operation was officially eliminated. 
 
Summary 
 
Between 2005 and 2007, the EU gave political, military-police and financial-logistic support for the AMIS. It can be 
said that the EU’s assistance was essential for the AU, for without their help the operation would have collapsed. 
Although the EU’s support was financial and logistic,13  the professional work of more than 100 military and police 
officers (who were delegated by the EU member states) helped a lot to keep up the functioning of the mission. It was an 
important contribution too that the EU transported more than 2,000 African soldiers and policemen to the operational 
area and to their homes from its own budget. The role of the EU was understated so its merits were not recognised even 
if they should have been. On the other hand, it can be said that the operation was successful and the lessons learned there 
were utilized in further missions.14 
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